Workers, Unions, and Takeovers
    

 This article demonstrates how takeovers affect workers’ wages and job security in the short-run. With the Right-to-work laws, these adverse effects are exacerbated when established. In this study, the impact was during the merger negotiations between Delta Airlines and northwest Airlines. In the two main limitations the inconclusive evidence of mergers impacts labor. Second, acquirers do not choose target firms randomly, which leads to a selection bias problems. 
 Also, this article mentioned the lack of attention to labor unions in studies of takeovers. Union representation battles are among the obstacles to post-merger integration in merging airlines. This study first analyzes the question on whether labor unions protect workers’ interest in takeovers. Pagano and Voplin (2005) argue that incumbent management often forms alliances with employees and offers them higher wages fend against takeovers. Workers and their unions, especially in target firms, need to protect their interests during takeovers. 
 In conclusion, fractions of workers who are in established primary industries shows strength in negative way concerning wage and employment outcomes after a takeover. When identifying the impact of unionization, the “Right-to-work” (RTW) laws were less favorable to unions. The original intent of these laws was to weaken unions. These RTW laws are associated with significantly lower levels of union destiny, and labor unions are strongly opposed to such laws. The results indicate that the negative effects of labor unions on wages and employment are exacerbated in places where unions face a less favorable bargaining environment and especially after a takeover when the labor union is probably weakened. 
Work Cited
Pagano M, Volpin PF (2005) Managers, workers, and corporate control. J Finance 60:841-868